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Abstract
 This paper analyses the effects of the policy changes in capital account liber-
alization and controls in Indonesia during the post-IMF program since 2004 and 
compare the previous period of liberalization regime before/after the Asian Crisis 
as well as the period under the IMF program in 1994-2003. The analysis based on 
the VAR (vector autoregressive) and Bayesian VAR models confirmed that capital 
controls and management of the Indonesian authority have actually worked to 
stabilize the economy, and to minimize the effects of capital inflows in the markets 
after the termination of the IMF program during the period 2004-2016Q1. The 
results indicate that the Indonesian economy has become less dependent on capital 
flows in the real economy as well as the monetary/ financial sector, which would 
mitigate the risk of speculative short capital flows since 2004. 
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1. Introduction
 The issue on capital account management and controls has been recognized as 
one of the important economic policies among the academics, as well as the parties 
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concerned including international organizations especially after the global finan-
cial crisis in 20081. Capital controls and management are important policy tools for 
emerging market economies under the current global economies and markets, 
where massive capital flows have put constant pressure on the economies concerned 
for the risk of capital account crises. 
 This paper examines the effectiveness of capital management and controls not 
only as short-term measures to avoid speculative capital flows, but also medium-to 
long-term policy tools to achieve stable economic growth and stabilization of the 
domestic financial market2. Capital account and foreign exchange controls have 
widely been introduced among major emerging economies in Asian countries, in-
cluding Indonesia. Indonesia was one of the most seriously affected countries, 
during the Asian Crisis in 1997/8. With termination of the IMF program in 2003, 
Indonesia introduced several measures for capital account and foreign exchange 
controls (e.g. a one-month minimum holding period for certain securities) to stabi-
lize the economy since mid-2000s.
 One of the major purposes of this paper is to identify the effectiveness of capital 
controls and regulations in Indonesia, by comparing between the period of liberal-
ization under the IMF program and pre- and the post-Asian crisis (1994-2003) with 
the period after the termination of IMF program (2004-2011) in terms of indepen-
dence of monetary policies, including capital / financial controls.
 The result of the analysis in this paper shows that several measures of capital 
controls have worked to stabilize the real economy and the financial market (money 
stocks, interest rate, and real effective exchange rate) and minimized the negative 
effects of capital flows on the domestic market since 2004, compared with the period 
1994-2003. Among the capital inflow variables, portfolio and other capital inflows, 
which are usually short-term and speculative in nature, have more positive re-
sponse functions of the real economy (GDP growth, production) than that of FDI. 
This trend is more apparent in the later period (2004-2016Q1) than the previous 
period over 1994-2003. The impulse response function of ‘other’ capital inflows 
(mostly external bank loans) have constantly positive for manufacturing in general, 
including nondurable manufacturing and energy sectors. The impulse response of 
manufacturing to FDI inflows has positive one in the nondurable and energy based 
manufacturing especially during the period 2004-2016Q1. 
 The results indicate that the effectiveness of overall capital controls which 
have been introduced in Indonesia.
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2. Capital Flows and Controls in Indonesia
 
2. 1 General Overview:  the Economy and Capital Flows
 Indonesia has achieved stable economic growth especially after the termina-
tion of the IMF program in 2003. Several factors, including independent economic 
policy, as well as monetary and fiscal policy, may have contributed to such a high 
performance. The global market conditions of mineral resources, including oil and 
gas prices, have also benefited the Indonesian economy for economic growth since 
mid-2000s. 
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Fig.1-1: Indonesia: GDP Growth Fig1-2: Indonesia: Manufacturing
 Indonesia substantially liberalized the capital/ financial account since 1980s, 
which is relatively early among the ASEAN countries. The external borrowing from 
offshore centers, especially Singapore, increased substantially among the non-fi-
nancial entities besides banks. Most of the firms had no currency hedging for 
transactions of foreign exchange, under the inflexible (or nearly fixed) regime of 
Rupiah during the period before the Asian Crisis (1997/8)3. In Indonesia Banks and 
majority of large firms, which had external debt, had significant loss and suffered 
from deteriorating balance sheet of those local banks and firms after the Asian 
Crisis. However, the Indonesian economy has recovered especially since the mid-
2000s, and is now joining the club of promising emerging economies after BRICs. It 
should be noted that it was only after the termination of the IMF program in 2003, 
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when Indonesia successfully completed early repayment to the IMF. 
 Capital inflows have affected the real economy as well as monetary and finan-
cial markets in Indonesia, especially in the 1990s. Capital inflows increased signifi-
cantly before the Asian Crisis (1997/8), but the net capital outflows accelerated after 
the crisis. Although the current account improved after the Asian Crisis, it was the 
result of deterioration of the economy with significant decrease of imports, which 
put the current account surplus. The balance of payments has broadly improved 
and the net capital inflows of FDI and portfolio investment continued after 2004 
with the stability of the economy. 
 Indonesia could not introduce extensive capital control measures under the 
IMF program4, and it was only after the termination of the IMF program in 2003 
that the intensive capital management and controls were undertaken. The domes-
tic market has achieved stability since 2004 in terms of the component of the 
portfolio liabilities, where debt securities have become major component, changed 
from equity recently (Fig.2-1). The domestic economy and financial market in 
Indonesia have significantly improved and stabilized since the mid-2000s, even 
under the expansion of capital flows in the global market in the 2000s. It indicates 
that the capital market has become relatively stable, since debt securities are 
generally more stable than stocks or equity securities. Moreover, short-term capital 
liabilities have decreased significantly since the mid-2000s (Fig.2-2). These recent 
trends could be explained by the capital management and controls introduced 
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intensively since the mid-2000s, It should be noted that the independence of mon-
etary policy with flexibility of policy options after 2004 have made the Indonesian 
economy more stable and resilient to the external shocks of capital and financial 
turbulence
 
2. 2 Capital Account Liberalization and Controls in Indonesia: Historical Overview
 As mentioned previously, capital account and foreign exchange controls in 
Indonesia were liberalized relatively early among the Southeast Asian countries 
since the latter part of 1980s. The KAOPEN (Chinn-Ito index) which shows capital 
account openness in each country indicates that Indonesia already started liberal-
ization in the 1970s, due to the shortage of foreign exchange from the deterioration 
of the current account, as well as increase in the interest rates5 (Fig.4). Major cap-
ital account liberalization measures were introduced mainly in the external trading 
by individual residents, while the overseas investment by the domestic firms was 
restricted until the end of 1980s. 
Fig. 4: KAOPEN (Asia)
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 Intensive liberalization of capital controls was initiated in the early 1990s, 
which accelerated capital inflows. However, many banks and firms in Indonesia 
suffered from ‘double mismatch’ of the currency (long-term domestic lending with 
short-term external borrowing of foreign currency that has foreign exchange risk) 
before the Asian Crisis (1997/8) in Indonesia. The government authority set the 
ceiling of the swap amount for non-residents just after the contagion of the Asian 
Crisis, but it was not effective to prevent the Rupiah currency from falling freely. 
Although some capital and foreign exchange management and controls were intro-
duced, those measures were not introduced during the period of IMF programs 
(1997-2003), since the IMF in principle took negative approach towards capital 
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control and management6. During the period of the Crisis, the Government author-
ity introduced banking regulations, and facilitated improvement in the manage-
ment of financial institutions under the specialized agency (Indonesian Bank 
Restructuring Agency, IBRA)7. However, the Crisis became serious under the IMF 
program, which put conditionality of drastic restructuring of the banking sector, 
including closure of 16 commercial banks. 
 The policy lesson of the Crisis in Indonesia indicates that a developing country 
with limited foreign reserves should set limits on its foreign currency debt through 
capital and foreign exchange controls and management8. 
 It was the post-IMF program period since 2004 that the Indonesian govern-
ment introduced intensive capital control and management measures. The offshore 
trading of foreign exchange with Rupiah and the exchange of local currency by the 
residents, as well as acquisition of foreign assets and the exchange of Rupiah are 
now restricted (Table 1)9.
 Restrictions of SBI trading for preventing from short-term and speculative in-
vestment capital (the policy of One-Month Holding Period, OMHP) were introduced 
in June 2010, and additional measures including the ceiling of external borrowing 
and raising the reserve ratio of foreign exchange have been introduced since 
January 2011. Also, Bank Indonesia introduced regulations to restrict rupiah 
transactions and foreign currency credit by banks in January 2011.
 In principle, all major transactions of foreign exchanges through offshore 
banks and non-banks are to be reported to the Bank Indonesia. The transactions in 
the domestic market are to be made by Rupiah currency in principle.
 
2. 3 Financial / Monetary Markets in Indonesia
 The Indonesian Rupiah significantly depreciated during the Asian Crisis, 
caused by the contagion of the capital outflows from the Asian region triggered by 
the fall of Thai Baht in July 1997. The real effective exchange rate of Indonesian 
Rupiah depreciated by 16% until April 1997 from April 1995, and Rupiah depreci-
ated significantly as adjustment of the real exchange rate of the currency, which 
appreciated significantly before the Crisis. However, the level of current account 
deficit of Indonesia was relatively modest with 2.5% of GDP in the pre-Asian Crisis 
(the 2nd quarter of 1996)10. Thus, the current account deficit was not the direct 
cause of the Crisis, but rather the contagion of the Crisis triggered by the fall of 
Thai Baht in July 1997. The fundamental reason, however, was that Indonesia had 
liberalized capital account regime that was vulnerable to the capital outflows before 
the Crisis. Significant outflows of capital from financial organizations as well as 
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Year
1989 Deregulation of ceiling of offshore trading by banks/financial instituions
1989 Foreign investors allowed up to 49％ shares
1989 Restriction of net open position(NPO) for forex trading banks/non-banks
1991 Banks' offshore borrowing up to 20％ of capital (←25％）；
premium for swap for 3 months raised 5%
1991 Approval required for external borrowings by national banks/public corp.
1991 Restriction of the net open positions(NPO) for forex trading banks/non-banks
1992 Allowed foreign investors to acquire a majority of share in commercial banks
1994 Approval required for commericial banks' external borrowins
1994 Deregulation on the net open positions(NPO) for forex trading banks/non-banks
1994 Deregulation on the external commercial borrowings
1995 Restriction on the external borrowings more than 2 years;
 The share of capital by non-residents to be less than 30％
1996 Foreign investment in mutual funds allowed in 100％ foreign owned capital
1997 Future trading of forex to be restrcted less than US$5 million
1997 Liberalization on investment in domestic shares by foreign investors (except banking sector)
1998 Deregulation of prohibited business sectors in FDI
1999  Govt approval not required for M&A
2001 Deregulation on lending of foreign currencies to non-residents by domestic banks
2001 Trading by the domestic banks prohibited;(i)Rupiah denominated overdraft;
(ii)Lending to non-residents; (iii)Transactions of Rupiah-denominated bonds issued 
by non-residents;(iv) Rupiah trading among non-residents; 
(v) Investment in stocks issued by non-residents in Rupiah currency
2004 Stirct regulation on the Reserves in Rupiah in bank accounts 
2004 Reporting required for offshore borrowings by financial institutions
2005 Short-term borrowings to be less than 30％ of total assets;
Central Bank(Bank Indonesia)'s approval required for lon-term external borrowings
2005 Reserve requirement in Bank Indonesia account raised
2005 Restrction oｆ ｌending in foreign currencies to non-residents by domesitc banks
2006 Transfers of Rupiah currency to non-residents prohibited
2008 Requirement of report to the Authority on external borrowings from non-residents 
2008 Ceiling of conversion of Rupiah to foreign exchange for non-residents over $100,000 monthly 
(requirement of special approval for over $100,000)
2008 Conversiton of Rupiah to foreign currency limited for current account transactions in principle
2010 Requirement of holding SBI(Central Bank securities) more than 1 month.
2011 Banks' offshore short-term borrowing up to 30％ of capital
Reserve requirement  of 5 percent of  total foreign-exchange holdings for Banks
All transactions of Banks are to be used by Rupiah; imposed restrictions of foreign currency 
credit and rupiah transfers to ofshore accounts
2012 Minimum capital raised to Rp10bn for investment (all sectors), and minimum paid
 in capital with Rp 3bn.
2014 External Borrowings are to be withrwan at thedomesticbanks to be reported at BI.
Compulsory minimum hedge ceiling for non-bank firms introduced 
2015 Compulsory report on offshore tradings of non-bank firms and financial firms 
All the transactions(cash/non-cash) in Indonesia should be made in Rupiah currency 
Note: The shaded area shows foreign exchange and capital controls/regulations
Sources: Author based on the resources of JETRO, Aramaki&Karikomi (2007), Magud&Reinhart(2006), etc.
Table 1: Capital and foreign exchange liberalization and controls (Indonesia)
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business firms have resulted in increased external debt burden of banks and do-
mestic firms, and the financial crisis accelerated deterioration of the economy.
 The exchange rate regime in Indonesia shifted from practically dollar-pegged 
to more flexible regime after the Asian crisis. As a result, the real effective exchange 
rate has not appreciated significantly during the past decade, which could be one of 
the important factors that Indonesia has been able to avoid the risk of currency 
crisis in the past decade. 
Fig.5: Nominal/Real Effective Exchange Rate (Indonesia)
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 Moreover, the foreign exchange and capital controls, the foreign exchange rate 
has made the Indonesian economy more resilient to the global market conditions, 
which have been volatile, especially pre- and post-global financial crisis of 2008. 
 The financial and capital markets have also stabilized, and the money market 
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rate fell to the level of around 4% and stabilized during the first quarter of 2012. 
The share price also sharply recovered especially in the latter part of 2000s, with 
stabilization of the economy.It rose again after the Lehman Shock since 2011, 
though some external factors have affected the level of stock price.
 
3. Effects of Capital Inflows 
 
3. 1 Past Studies 
 On the effectiveness of capital controls and management, Goh (2005) indicates 
that the controls not only reduce the total flows (hence increase monetary autono-
my), but to some extent affected the private long-term flows, citing the experience 
of Malaysia in 1998.  The IMF has officially endorsed capital management and 
controls, as described in the staff notes (see Ostry et al. 2010. 2011), which admitted 
the effectiveness of capital inflow controls officially for the first time as official 
documents by the IMF. However, as Habermeier et al. (2011) put it, the IMF has 
not completely authorize capital controls on outflows of capital and put more em-
phasis on macro-prudential measures and market based policy measures on capital 
management.
 In the case of Indonesia, after the termination of the IMF program, the author-
ity has strengthened the capital management and financial controls, including 
prudential measures. The experience of Indonesia may be evaluated from the aca-
demic point of view. As shown in this paper, the capital inflows have become limited 
effects on the Indonesian Economy and the market, and it could be result of the 
Indonesian authority’s efforts to control the instability of the capital flows especial-
ly portfolio investment flows, which is shown in the paper by Bank Indonesia 
(Hendarsah, 2010).
 There are several studies on the effect of capital inflows on economic growth in 
emerging and developing economies. Among the capital inflows, FDI is generally 
considered as one of the most important capital resources that could contribute to 
economic growth in several past studies. Indeed, FDI may raise economic growth in 
the recipient countries.  However, the contribution of FDI to economic growth and 
expanding productive activities would depend on the circumstances in the recipient 
countries. Thus, several studies on the effect of FDI on the economy show inconclu-
sive results. 
 Carkovic and Levine (2002), for example, argue that there is not a robust, 
causal link running from FDI to economic growth. Some empirical study (Alfaro, et 
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al., 2009, 2010) suggests that FDI could play an important role in contributing to 
economic growth where financial markets are developed enough; the host country 
benefits from backward linkages between the foreign and domestic firms. In this 
regard, Cipollina et al. (2011) suggest that FDI has positive and statistically signif-
icant growth effect in recipient countries during 1992-2004, and the effect is 
stronger in capital intensive and in technologically advanced sectors. These studies 
indicate FDI could contribute economic growth under certain conditions (matured 
financial markets, capital and technology intensive sectors, etc.).
 Ghosh and Qureshi (2016) also show that while capital inflows generally lead 
to macroeconomic imbalances and financial vulnerabilities, as well as to a greater 
likelihood of banking and currency crisis, other investment and portfolio flows (es-
pecially portfolio debt flows) are the most risky, while FDI seems to be the safest 
type of capital inflow, based on a sample of 53 emerging economies over 
1980–2013.
 In the case of Indonesia, several studies indicate that FDI has limited impact 
on the economy in terms of economic growth. Dhanani and Hasnain (2002) found 
that contribution of FDI to economic growth in Indonesia is rather modest in total 
capital formation and development in industries, and that FDI put negative impact 
on the balance of payments due to the large propensity to import production inputs 
from the study in the late 1990s. The study by Effendi and Soemantri (2003) reveals 
that the effect of FDI on regional economic growth in Indonesia is relatively weak 
in accelerating the economic growth. These studies suggest that Indonesia may not 
fully utilize potential benefit of FDI for economic growth.  
 In terms of capital controls, Blundell-Wignall and Roulet (2014) suggested 
based on the panel regressions contrast with the idea that controls are most bene-
ficial in a crisis, while there was no support for overall controls over the full 
sample. 
 This paper confirms the fact that capital inflows, including FDI, had very 
limited impact upon the real economy in Indonesia, and shows that capital man-
agement and controls have contributed to the stability of the economy with rela-
tively high growth since 2004 until today. The next section will examine the effects 
of capital inflows on the real economy and financial, as well as foreign exchange 
markets, dividing the period between the pre- and post-IMF Program.
3. 2  The Effects of Capital Inflows on the Real Economy and Foreign Exchange, 
Monetary/Financial Markets: Panel regression
 One of the major objectives of the analyses is to identify the effectiveness of 
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capital controls and regulations introduced after the termination of the IMF pro-
grams, to compare the period of liberalization under the IMF program during and 
after the Asian crisis (1994-2003) with the post-IMF program period during 2004-
2016(Q1). Thus, the covered period is divided into the period 1994-2003, and the 
period 2004-2016(Q1). The latter period covers the period when the government 
authority became independent from the IMF’s conditionality in economic policy, in 
terms of monetary and exchange controls/management to stabilize the market and 
the real economy. The results of regression analyses indicate that the total capital 
inflows (net) had significant correlation with GDP growth during1994-2003, and 
the FDI had positive correlation with GDP growth, while portfolio investment had 
negative with GDP growth. 
 The regression equations during the period also indicate that the Asian Crisis 
(Crisis dummy 1) had significantly negative impact upon the GDP growth.
Table 2: Indonesia: Capital Flows and GDP growth [1994-2016]
【Dependent Variable：　GDP growth】
6102-40023002-4991 (Q1)
【Explanatory Variables】 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (10)
2600.00020.0)teN(latoT
)540.0()390.0(
)041.0()412.0(
9864.0IDF * 0.0867
　　（% of GDP） (0.263) (0.119)
)927.0()587.1(
4013.0-oiloftroP ** -0.0467 -0.0516 -0.0587
　　（% of GDP） (0.125) (0.067) (0.062) (0.061)
)369.0-()628.0-()696.0-()974.2-(
  Others 0.2835 0340.0*
　　（% of GDP） (0.162) (0.053)
)218.0()547.1(
2331.0REER ***740.0***
(0.031) (0.016)
(4.263) (2.865)
439.41-)gol(2M ** -16.385 *** -0.441
(3.002) (2.776) (0.522)
)548.0-()209.5-()579.4-(
5790.01680.07171.0-etaRtseretnI -0.004
(money market rate) (0.105) (0.094) (0.091) (0.066)
(-1.638) (0.921) (1.071) (-0.057)
Mfg.Production 0.1783 *** 0.1716 *** 0.0589 0.0377 0.0621
(0.048) (0.046) (0.043) (0.033) (0.038)
(3.695) (3.710) (1.375) (1.154) (1.640)
Non-durable Mfg 0.0423 0.0148 0.0326 -0.0310 -0.045 0.0013 0.0017 0.0016 0.0015
(0.043) (0.041) (0.042) (0.035) (0.037) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
(0.980) (0.361) (0.784) (-0.878) (-1.221) (0.890) (1.153) (1.230) (1.093)
9545.0secirPliO *** 0.6968 4210.0*** ***
(0.158) (0.150) (0.004)
(3.461) (4.658) (3.168)
Crisis dummy -8.732 *** -9.909 *** -9.038 *** -8.183 *** -5.777 ***
(1997/8) (2.029) (1.625) (1.826) (1.908) (1.884)
-4.3029 -6.0991 -4.9496 -4.2888 -3.066
Crisis dummy 3425.0-4445.0-1926.0-7234.0-
(2008/9) )204.0()683.0()844.0()724.0(
)403.1-()014.1-()504.1-()410.1-(
Constant 4.175 *** -5.946 * 4.097 *** 77.511 *** 82.792 *** 5.457 *** 4.708 *** 8.421 ** 1.420 4.699 *** 5.645 ***
(0.77) (2.83) (0.74) (14.45) (13.28) (0.181) (0.662) (3.300) (1.623) (0.324) (0.125)
(5.407) (-2.104) (5.529) (5.362) (6.235) (30.17) (7.115) (2.552) (0.875) (14.48) (45.17)
R2 0.7273 0.7467 0.7497 0.8551 0.8289 0.0956 0.1106 0.0565 0.1729 0.2163 0.0810
9404.sbO
Notes 1. Each capital flow variable (Total. FDI, Portfolio, Other investment) are as percentage of  GDP
            2. Period is between 1994Q1 and 2015Q3.
            3. Figures in parentheses are standard deviation (upper) and t-value (lower).
Sources: Author's calculation based on database of IFS (IMF) and Bank Indonesia
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 On the other hand, capital inflows are not statistically correlated with the real 
economy (GDP growth and manufacturing production) during 2004-2016 (Q1). 
During the period, real effective exchange rate (REER) and oil price only had sig-
nificantly positive correlation with GDP growth. It should be also noted that the 
Global Financial Crisis (Crisis dummy 2) did not have any significant impact on 
the GDP growth during the period. It could indicate that capital management and 
controls introduced during the period might have worked to stabilize the economy 
and the market in Indonesia.
 The regression results show the fact that the real economy (GDP growth) has 
become more independent from the external capital flows since 2004, as compared 
with the period 1994-2003.
3. 3  Analysis:  Vector Autoregressive Regression (VAR) / Bayesian VAR (BVAR) 
models
This section is devoted to an analysis of the effects of capital controls on the stabil-
ity in the market and the real economy over the period 1994-2016(Q1) through the 
changes in the response of the shocks of capital inflows (Total, FDI, portfolio, other 
investment) based on the Vector auto regression (VAR) and Bayesian VAR (BVAR) 
models. 
 The impulse response functions based on the VAR model are used to produce 
the time path of the dependent variables in the VAR, to shocks from all the explan-
atory variables. This study estimated the effects of capital inflows on the monetary 
and financial as well as the real economy in Indonesia based on VAR models com-
prising GDP growth rate, financial market indicators (money market rate, money 
stock [M2]), foreign exchange market (real effective exchange rate), foreign ex-
change reserves, manufacturing production index, BVAR method could be used to 
estimate the response to some shock variables with not sufficient variables, which 
would be the case in point (as quarterly data). The difference with standard VAR 
models lies in the fact that the model parameters are treated as random variables, 
and prior probabilities are assigned to them. 
 The VAR models in the analysis are classified into the real sector analysis and 
the financial market, and the former model includes variables of capital flows 
(Total, FDI, portfolio, other investment; quarterly, percent of GDP), GDP growth 
[quarterly, y/y], as well as manufacturing.  Since the Indonesian economy has been 
affected significantly by oil/natural gas prices, the variables of manufacturing sec-
tors are divided into two variables:  total manufacturing and nondurable manufac-
turing [including oil/gas sectors]).
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 The other model includes those variables of capital flows (Total, FDI, portfolio, 
other investment), the real effective exchange rate [REER], as well the monetary/ 
financial sectors respectively. Accordingly, the general equations of VAR model are 
as follows:
 (1)
 
ｙ1t   α1     β1 γ1 χ1 ψ1 ω1  y1t-j           u1
ｙ2t   α2      β2 γ2 χ2 ψ2 ω2       y2t-j  
ｙ3t =   α3    +  +  ∑ β3 γ3 χ3 ψ3 ω3       y3t-j u3            
u2            
ｙ4t   α4     β4 γ4 χ4 ψ4 ω4       y4t-j           u4 
Where the explanatory variables of the regressions (indicated below) are in-
cluded as y1 (t-j indicates the previous period of t).
 Variables of capital inflows, namely (i) Total capital inflows (net) of the previ-
ous quarter (Total); (ii)Foreign direct investment inflows (net and gross) of the 
previous quarter (FDI); (iii) Portfolio inflows (net) (Portfolio); (iv) Other investment 
inflows (Other) are included in the first column of the VAR model. 
 The variables of the vector in the second and other columns could be any of the 
following variables: (a) GDP growth rate, (b) manufacturing (total), (c) nondurable 
manufacturing (including oil/gas and mineral related sectors), (d) real effective 
exchange rate, (e) money stocks (M2), (f) money market rate, and (g) foreign re-
serves. There are two models involved in the analysis as follows11: 
 The first model includes those variables of any of the capital inflow variables 
(Total, FDI, portfolio, other investment) and the real sector of the economy: GDP 
growth rate; total manufacturing production; nondurable manufacturing produc-
tion (incl. oil and other mineral sector) 
 (i)  Capital inflows (Total; FDI; Portfolio; Other investment) (quarterly, per-
cent of GDP) 
 (ii) Manufacturing Production:  Changes in total manufacturing production 
(y/y) [VAR]
Index (2010=100) [Bayesian VAR]
 (iii)  Nondurable manufacturing (incl. oil/energy sector) production (y/y) (same 
as (ii)) 
 (iv)  Real GDP Growth (y/y)  [VAR]; (Index, 2010=100) [BVAR] As an example, 
the VAR model including total capital flows is shown as follows:
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 (2)
 
 Totalt   α1     β1 γ1 χ1 ψ1   Totalt-j      u1
Mfgt          ＝ α2   ＋∑ β2 γ2 χ2 ψ2      Mfgt-j ＋  u2       
NDMfg         α3 β3 γ3 χ3 ψ3     NDMfgt-j            u3 
GDPt         α4   β4 γ4   χ4 ψ4     GDPt-j              u2                
 The second model includes those variables of any of the capital inflow variables 
(Total, FDI, portfolio, other investment), and financial/monetary/foreign exchange 
markets: real effective exchange rate; money stocks (M2); interest rate (money 
market rate); and Share prices as follows:
 (i)  Capital inflows (Total; FDI; Portfolio; Other investment) (quarterly, per-
cent of GDP) 
 (ii) Real effective exchange rate (REER) (Index)
 (iii) Money stocks : M2 (log)
 (iv) Money market rate (Intrate)
 (v) Share prices: Share(Index)
 From the above specifications, the VAR model entails 4 times of the equation 
(3), which has one of the variables other than capital inflow variables. For example, 
the equation on the Model 2, including Total and the exogenous shock to the other 
variables, is as follows:
 The VAR model including total capital flows sis as follows:
 (3)
 
Totalt   α1     β1 γ1 χ1 ψ1 ω1      Totalt-j     u1
REERt  α2                      β2 γ2 χ2 ψ2 ω2      REERt-j            u2        
M2t  ＝ α3     ＋∑ β3 γ3 χ3 ψ3 ω3      M2t-j  ＋   u3         
Intratet         α4   β4 γ4 χ4 ψ4 ω4      Intratet-j          u4       
Sharet   α5     β5 γ5 χ5  ψ5 ω5      Sharet-j           u5 
 
3.4.1 ADF test and Stationarity-y
 Prior to the analysis based on the VAR model stationarity of the variables in-
volved in the regression is tested by ADF (augmented Dickey-Fuller) method for 
the unit root tests (Table 2). 
 Capital inflow variables (Total, FDI, portfolio, and other investment), manu-
facturing (total and nondurable) production (y/y), as well as GDP growth (for the 
period 2004-2016Q1) has unit root without first lag. However, the ADF test results 
show that unit root is not rejected with level for GDP growth (1994-2003) and FDI 
(1994-2003), so that unit root is rejected for the first lag of each variable, which is 
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expressed as I (1)12. It should be noted that stationarity of some economic indicators 
(GDP growth rate, FDI, REER, share) was not kept without first lag during the 
period 1994-2003, covering the Asian Crisis period (1997/8). For other variables, 
the stationarity is confirmed with level, except the variables of REER, LogM2 and 
Interest rate (Intrate), which are confirmed stationarity with first lag of variables 
during the whole period (1994-2016Q1).
Table 3: Augumented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)Test (Indoensia)
6102-40023002-4991 (Q1)
level p lag 1st p lag level p lag 1st p lag
GDP -2.76 0.07 (1) -4.35 0.001 (0) *** -3.43 0.001 (0) ** -8.29 0.000 (0) ***
(y/y, %) -2.66 0.26 (1) -4.34 0.007 (0) *** -0.39 0.108 (0) ** -8.34 0.000 (0) ***
Total -3.40 0.02 (0) ** -6.54 0.000 (1) *** -3.45 0.014 (1) ** -13.73 0.000 (0) ***
(% o fGDP) -3.49 0.05 (0) * -6.48 0.000 (1) *** -7.41 0.000 (0) *** -13.62 0.000 (0) ***
FDI -2.19 0.21 (0) -8.87 0.000 (0) *** -5.11 0.000 (0) *** -5.35 0.000 (0) ***
(% o fGDP) -2.72 0.24 (0) -8.75 0.000 (0) *** -5.84 0.000 (0) *** -5.37 0.000 (0) ***
Portfolio -5.11 0.00 (0) *** -6.72 0.000 (2) *** -6.21 0.000 (0) *** -7.97 0.000 (2) ***
(% o fGDP) -5.09 0.00 (0) *** -6.67 0.000 (2) *** -6.22 0.000 (0) *** -7.87 0.000 (2) ***
Other -3.91 0.00 (0) *** -8.35 0.000 (0) *** -6.68 0.000 (0) *** -7.12 0.000 (2) ***
(% o fGDP) -3.87 0.02 (0) ** -8.23 0.000 (0) *** -7.50 0.000 (0) *** -7.03 0.000 (2) ***
REER -2.13 0.23 (1) -4.35 0.001 (0) *** -1.85 0.350 (0) -5.48 0.000 (0) ***
[Index] -2.21 0.47 (1) -4.33 0.008 (0) ** -1.78 0.701 (0) -5.48 0.000 (0) ***
M2（log) -2.11 0.24 (0) -4.63 0.001 (0) *** -2.49 0.124 (4) -2.90 0.053 (3) *
-0.37 0.99 (0) -5.12 0.001 (0) *** -0.36 0.986 (4) * -3.72 0.031 (3) **
IntRate -9.40 0.00 (4) *** -3.43 0.021 (3) ** -2.04 0.270 (0) -3.65 0.008 (2) ***
(JIBOR) -2.75 0.23 (3) -4.87 0.002 (0) ** -3.68 0.034 (1) ** -3.63 0.039 (2) **
Share -2.67 0.09 (1) * -4.37 0.002 (0) *** -1.18 0.677 (0) -5.75 0.000 (0) ***
[2005=100] -2.19 0.47 (1) -4.34 0.009 (0) *** -1.71 0.732 (0) -5.76 0.000 (0) ***
Mfg -5.22 0.00 (0) *** -5.28 0.000 (0) *** -3.93 0.004 (0) *** -7.07 0.000 (3) ***
(y/y) -4.50 0.01 (3) *** -5.22 0.001 (0) *** -4.74 0.002 (7) *** -7.01 0.000 (3) ***
Nondurable -6.10 0.00 (0) *** -9.92 0.000 (0) *** -6.64 0.000 (0) *** -7.88 0.000 (1) ***
MFG(y/y) -6.00 0.00 (0) *** -9.77 0.000 (0) *** -6.57 0.000 (0) *** -7.79 0.000 (1) ***
Notes 1 Upper: Cnstant; Lower: Constant and Trend  2  ***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
          3. Real Effective Exchange Rate（REER), Foreign Reserves (log). Quarterly Figures.
   4.Nondurable: Nondurable Manufacturing indusry ( incl. oil, coal and other energy related sectors)
Sources: Author's calculation based on the data of International Financial Statistics (IMF)、BIS(REER)
 
3. 4. 2 Granger Causality Test
 Granger causality tests are essentially those measures to improve in forecast-
ing association and correlation between the variables. By using an F-test to jointly 
test for the significance of the lags on the explanatory variables, this in effect tests 
for ‘Granger causality’ between these variables13.
 This section focuses on the causality between the variables of capital inflows 
and foreign exchange rates, monetary and financial markets, as well as the real 
economy (real GDP growth rate, manufacturing production) based on the quarterly 
data through VAR model. The analysis is based on the quarterly data of each 
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variable during the period1994-2016Q1, dividing 1994-2003, and 2004-2016Q1, 
and the latter period is also divided into the pre-Global Financial Crisis (2004-
2008Q2) and the post Global Financial Crisis (2008Q3-2016Q1) to verify the effects 
of changes in capital inflows in each period.  In Indonesia, capital flow management 
and controls were not significantly introduced, especially under the IMF program 
continued between 1994 and 2003.
 The results of Granger Causality test of each variable, with the average of the 
first, 2nd, 3rd and 4th (quarter) lags are summarized in Table4.
Table 4: Granger Causality (Indonesia) [1994-2016(Q1)]
1994-2003 GDP Total FDI Portfolio Other REER M2 Intrate Share Mfg NdMFG
526.2561.0577.0824.0083.0PDG * 17.80 *** 2.154 0.587 1.841 1.878
Total 3.093 *** 0.842 0.838 6.286 *** 1.120 26.54 *** 2.262 2.093 4.683 ** 0.031
FDI 3.343 * 0.425 0.607 2.207 0.886 6.664 ** 0.613 0.666 2.860 * 0.842
Portfolio 1.950 0.197 0.175 10.13 *** 1.326 21.47 *** 1.989 1.375 3.226 * 0.315
Other 5.162 *** 0.149 0.549 0.759 2.328 4.089 ** 1.815 1.643 3.974 ** 0.462
REER 13.58 *** 0.493 0.313 1.023 14.51 *** 12.71 *** 3.283 * 1.973 4.899 ** 0.870
M2 (log) 2.115 0.202 0.796 0.368 8.308 *** 1.038 4.502 ** 0.679 2.257 0.540
Interest rate 15.82 *** 4.652 ** 0.815 9.171 *** 3.030 ** 3.706 ** 2.132 5.742 *** 3.278 ** 2.027
Share 0.799 6.025 *** 1.253 4.792 ** 3.314 2.625 * 1.799 0.505 1.494 0.489
Manufacturing 3.535 ** 2.086 2.390 0.777 0.510 2.259 0.970 5.041 * 2.539 * 1.648
NdMfg 0.558 0.053 0.546 0.171 0.881 0.079 0.597 0.179 0.334 0.390
2004-2008(Q2) GDP Total FDI Portfolio Other REER M2 Intrate Share Mfg NdMFG
638.4940.1681.0809.1467.1576.0921.1792.2860.2279.0PDG **
Total 1.225 0.645 1.605 0.502 12.01 *** 1.456 0.679 0.584 0.830 0.332
FDI 1.683 4.568 ** 1.311 5.391 ** 4.759 ** 2.750 * 0.273 0.102 2.904 * 0.836
Portfolio 0.409 1.523 0.277 0.951 0.878 0.376 0.501 0.534 0.637 1.656
Other 3.696 ** 0.068 0.511 3.652 ** 4.257 ** 1.563 0.866 0.213 5.463 ** 0.407
REER 0.593 1.619 0.272 1.691 0.304 2.326 1.899 0.424 0.758 0.407
M2 (log) 0.240 2.954 * 0.675 0.439 0.542 2.463 * 0.231 0.220 0.049 1.357
Interest rate 2.215 0.491 0.118 1.226 3.034 * 0.606 0.069 0.380 1.116 0.364
Share 1.717 0.318 0.206 1.879 0.646 1.419 0.623 0.171 2.825 * 3.481 *
Manufacturing 6.037 *** 0.370 0.742 0.436 0.670 1.607 1.311 2.283 1.340 0.310
NdMfg 1.077 4.214 ** 2.477 * 1.145 1.847 37.80 *** 0.869 0.348 1.359 1.256
2008-2016(Q1) GDP Total FDI Portfolio Other REER M2 Intrate Share Mfg NdMFG
376.2130.2549.1579.0333.0PDG * 1.879 1.818 0.283 0.508 7.165 ***
Total 0.978 1.860 0.548 1.320 0.643 0.425 1.863 0.462 2.749 * 0.230
FDI 1.614 1.783 1.482 8.762 1.712 0.631 2.174 0.755 0.978 0.801
Portfolio 1.592 0.723 2.227 1.292 0.747 0.357 2.751 * 0.450 1.502 0.964
Other 1.676 0.917 0.588 0.865 1.287 0.794 0.809 0.493 0.900 0.743
REER 4.372 ** 0.269 0.197 0.597 0.264 0.762 0.350 1.151 0.689 1.719
M2 (log) 1.262 1.040 0.284 0.411 1.491 0.384 1.294 0.457 0.791 1.499
Interest rate 2.351 2.406 3.724 ** 0.553 2.696 * 2.685 * 0.874 0.472 4.290 ** 0.341
Share 1.668 0.818 1.436 0.335 1.306 1.530 1.260 1.864 1.273 0.566
Manufacturing 0.676 1.286 0.454 0.084 0.659 2.509 * 0.328 0.759 1.337 0.680
NdMfg 1.330 1.007 0.936 0.535 1.064 0.527 0.718 1.467 0.674 1.534
Notes 1  GDP: real GDP growth (%, y/y); Capital Inflows (Total, FDI, Portfolio, Other): % of GDP;
              Real Effective Exchange Rate（REER: 2010=100); money market rate for 'interst rate'; 
             Share (Jakarta Stock Exchange Index, 2005=100); Manufacturing (y-o-y, %);  NdMFG： NonDurable Manufacturing (y-o-y, %)
          2 The period is from 1994Q1to  2016 Q1
     3  Lags are average of 1st to 4th order (quarterly).
  4  Figures are F-value. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Sources: Author's calculation based on International Financial Statistics (IFS) database(IMF); BIS (Real Effective Exchange Rate
 
 The variables involved in the analysis include quarterly figures of net capital 
inflows (Total, FDI, portfolio investment, and other investment) [percent of GDP], 
real effective exchange rates (REER [index]), money stocks (M2), money market 
rate (Interest rate or Intrate), manufacturing production (the whole sector [Mfg] 
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and nondurable manufacturing [NdMfg]) indices (year-on-year growth). This is in 
accordance with the results of ADF (Augmented Dickey-Fuller) tests of each vari-
able. The figures show that the validity of variables of left column causes the vari-
able of right column. 
 The overall capital inflows, especially short-term capital flows (portfolio/ other 
investment had significant causality with both real economy (GDP growth, manu-
facturing production) and the financial and monetary sector during 1994-2003. The 
total capital inflows Granger cause the GDP growth, manufacturing (Mfg), and 
money stocks (M2) during 1994-2003. FDI has Granger cause relationship with M2 
but not with (total) manufacturing production, while portfolio and other investment 
not only Granger cause interest rate but also M2 significantly during the 1994-
2003. Significant impact of interest rate (money market rate) on the real economy 
is also observed, since it Granger causes GDP growth rate, manufacturing produc-
tion, as well as REER, through short-term capital flows (portfolio/ other invest-
ments) during 1994-2003. The overall impact of the capital flows on the real econo-
my and markets are significant under the free capital flow regime during the 
period.
 On the other hand, Granger causality between the capital inflows and the 
market significantly weakened during the period 2004-2016(Q1). 
 The capital inflows during 2004-2008 Q2 (before the Lehman Shock), capital 
inflows had significant causality with REER. In general, capital inflows had signif-
icant impact upon productive activities during the period. The FDI and other capital 
inflows also Granger caused manufacturing production during the period. It should 
be also noted that among the capital inflow variables, other investment Granger 
causes manufacturing significantly during 2004-2008 Q2, when the market was in 
‘bubble’ situation under the abundant global liquidity with carry trade globally.
 However, causality between capital flows and domestic market has become 
insignificant since 2008 Q3, after the ‘Lehman Shock’ followed by the Global 
Financial Crisis. The domestic market has become more in line with fundamental 
causality between interest rate and GDP growth. This indicates that normal 
mechanism in the financial sector has become worked: interest rate would cause 
manufacturing production and also FDI which has been one of the major forces 
productive activities in Indonesia.
 It shows that the overall effects of capital as well as foreign exchange manage-
ment and controls effectively contributed to such a significant change in the 
granger causality between the capital flows and the real economy and markets in 
Indonesia from 2008 Q3 to 2016 Q1.
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 The above Granger causality tests show that the impact of capital flows on the 
real economy as well as monetary/financial markets has become insignificant, and 
that the real and monetary/ financial sectors have much more independent with 
the capital inflows since 2004. This trend is also observed by the regression based 
analysis, as shown in the following sections. 
 
3.5 Variance decomposition 
The variance decomposition of GDP growth based on the VAR model is shown in 
Table 5-1(VAR) and 5-2 (BVAR).  The overall results of VAR and BVAR share 
similar trends of decreasing the impact of capital flows on the real economy (GDP 
growth).
 The share of the decomposition of GDP growth during 1994-2003 indicates 
that net capital flows had significant influence on the growth during the period. 
Particularly, the shares of short-term capital flows (portfolio and other investment) 
are very high as compared with that of FDI  
 However, the share of all the capital flows, especially portfolio and other capi-
tal flows, significantly declined during 2004-2016 both in the VAR and BVAR 
models (Table 5-1, 5-2), 
 Thus, the overall results of variance decomposition with regard to GDP growth 
indicates that short-term (portfolio/other) investment have decreased significantly 
in in its share in the decomposition of economic growth since 2004, and the FDI has 
become less important component for GDP growth recently.
 The changes in the variance decomposition of VAR analyses indicate that GDP 
growth has become more dependent on the domestic factors, rather than capital 
inflows in the decades. This would also suggest that the termination of the IMF 
program has had some favourable effect on the real economy in terms of less depen-
dence on the short-term capital flows in Indonesia.  
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)1Q(6102-40023002-4991
 Period Total MFG NDMFG GDP Total MFG NDMFG GDP
1 0.475 9.135 5.449 84.942 0.419 3.991 10.186 85.403
2 7.153 7.958 4.606 80.283 1.731 5.977 11.951 80.342
3 10.079 9.106 4.363 76.452 2.848 7.445 12.011 77.695
4 10.307 10.163 4.296 75.234 3.541 8.267 11.856 76.336
5 10.256 10.629 4.272 74.844 3.892 8.653 11.754 75.701
6 10.394 10.739 4.254 74.613 4.047 8.814 11.707 75.432
7 10.568 10.735 4.243 74.454 4.108 8.875 11.689 75.328
8 10.676 10.721 4.237 74.366 4.131 8.897 11.682 75.290
9 10.721 10.716 4.235 74.328 4.138 8.904 11.680 75.278
10 10.733 10.717 4.234 74.316 4.141 8.906 11.680 75.274
 Period FDI MFG NDMFG GDP FDI MFG NDMFG GDP
1 3.860 10.222 1.789 84.128 0.559 4.853 11.058 83.530
2 9.352 8.455 1.514 80.679 1.692 7.769 12.775 77.763
3 9.380 8.756 1.485 80.378 2.327 9.588 12.608 75.478
4 9.327 9.277 1.476 79.920 2.658 10.458 12.378 74.507
5 9.374 9.604 1.468 79.554 2.810 10.807 12.269 74.114
6 9.372 9.726 1.464 79.438 2.872 10.931 12.228 73.969
7 9.377 9.761 1.462 79.399 2.895 10.971 12.215 73.919
8 9.378 9.769 1.462 79.392 2.903 10.984 12.210 73.903
9 9.378 9.770 1.462 79.391 2.905 10.988 12.209 73.898
10 9.378 9.770 1.462 79.391 2.906 10.989 12.209 73.897
 Period PORT MFG NDMFG GDP PORT MFG NDMFG GDP
1 2.253 11.526 6.802 79.419 0.056 5.230 10.596 84.119
2 5.109 9.814 5.815 79.261 0.182 7.926 12.416 79.476
3 5.742 10.213 5.754 78.290 0.296 10.054 12.315 77.335
4 5.702 10.845 5.723 77.730 0.334 11.281 12.074 76.310
5 5.765 11.144 5.691 77.401 0.344 11.864 11.941 75.852
6 5.862 11.223 5.675 77.240 0.346 12.108 11.885 75.662
7 5.919 11.232 5.670 77.179 0.346 12.203 11.863 75.588
8 5.940 11.230 5.669 77.161 0.346 12.238 11.856 75.560
9 5.945 11.229 5.669 77.157 0.346 12.251 11.853 75.550
10 5.946 11.229 5.669 77.156 0.346 12.256 11.852 75.546
 Period OTHER MFG NDMFG GDP OTHER MFG NDMFG GDP
1 14.853 2.515 10.722 71.910 1.452 2.711 10.651 85.186
2 28.384 3.936 9.101 58.579 4.665 4.233 12.136 78.966
3 28.992 4.945 9.028 57.034 6.216 5.167 12.197 76.420
4 28.877 5.318 9.013 56.792 6.992 5.609 12.067 75.332
5 28.958 5.427 8.986 56.628 7.333 5.785 11.992 74.890
6 29.055 5.452 8.969 56.523 7.464 5.848 11.962 74.727
7 29.111 5.456 8.962 56.472 7.509 5.869 11.951 74.670
8 29.134 5.456 8.959 56.451 7.525 5.876 11.948 74.651
9 29.142 5.455 8.958 56.444 7.530 5.879 11.947 74.645
10 29.145 5.455 8.958 56.442 7.531 5.879 11.946 74.643
Note：1 Standard errors are not shown in the table.  2 The period for 1994-2016Q1
Sources: Author's calculation based on the data of International Financial Statistics(IMF), Bank Indonesia
 Table 5-1: Variance Decomposition of GDP growth (Indonesia) [VAR]
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)1Q(6102-40023002-4991
 Period Total MFG NDMFG GDP Total MFG NDMFG GDP
1 4.930 43.096 1.245 50.729 2.217 4.162 1.665 91.956
2 8.377 47.750 2.912 40.962 1.674 11.607 2.233 84.487
3 9.353 47.699 3.947 39.000 1.524 15.434 2.169 80.873
4 9.590 47.559 4.407 38.443 1.456 17.598 2.102 78.844
5 9.649 47.498 4.585 38.268 1.416 18.954 2.055 77.575
6 9.665 47.475 4.650 38.211 1.390 19.874 2.023 76.714
7 9.669 47.467 4.672 38.192 1.370 20.536 1.999 76.095
8 9.671 47.464 4.680 38.186 1.356 21.035 1.981 75.628
9 9.671 47.463 4.682 38.184 1.345 21.423 1.968 75.265
10 9.671 47.463 4.683 38.183 1.336 21.733 1.957 74.975
 Period FDI MFG NDMFG GDP FDI MFG NDMFG GDP
1 1.761 54.683 3.501 40.054 1.725 6.433 1.172 90.670
2 1.754 59.878 5.047 33.322 1.860 15.022 1.589 81.528
3 1.786 60.061 5.771 32.382 1.801 19.491 1.469 77.238
4 1.789 60.049 6.003 32.159 1.746 22.019 1.376 74.859
5 1.788 60.040 6.072 32.100 1.708 23.596 1.315 73.380
6 1.787 60.037 6.091 32.084 1.682 24.663 1.273 72.381
7 1.787 60.036 6.097 32.080 1.664 25.429 1.243 71.664
8 1.787 60.036 6.098 32.079 1.650 26.005 1.221 71.125
9 1.787 60.036 6.099 32.079 1.639 26.453 1.203 70.706
10 1.787 60.036 6.099 32.078 1.630 26.810 1.189 70.371
 Period PORT MFG NDMFG GDP PORT MFG NDMFG GDP
1 2.282 47.668 1.954 48.095 0.049 4.918 1.153 93.879
2 5.885 52.350 2.710 39.055 0.053 12.876 1.574 85.497
3 6.555 52.677 3.242 37.526 0.057 17.152 1.487 81.303
4 6.678 52.696 3.472 37.154 0.057 19.588 1.410 78.944
5 6.703 52.691 3.555 37.051 0.057 21.112 1.358 77.474
6 6.708 52.687 3.582 37.023 0.056 22.144 1.322 76.478
7 6.710 52.686 3.590 37.014 0.056 22.886 1.296 75.762
8 6.710 52.685 3.593 37.012 0.056 23.444 1.277 75.223
9 6.710 52.685 3.593 37.011 0.056 23.879 1.261 74.804
10 6.710 52.685 3.594 37.011 0.055 24.226 1.249 74.469
 Period OTHER MFG NDMFG GDP OTHER MFG NDMFG GDP
1 12.592 44.775 0.520 42.113 7.009 5.098 2.429 85.464
2 13.717 47.995 2.456 35.832 6.925 11.697 3.229 78.149
3 14.160 47.607 3.814 34.419 6.840 15.279 3.153 74.729
4 14.268 47.306 4.438 33.988 6.783 17.321 3.065 72.832
5 14.293 47.180 4.678 33.850 6.746 18.597 3.003 71.654
6 14.299 47.134 4.762 33.805 6.721 19.460 2.961 70.858
7 14.301 47.118 4.790 33.791 6.703 20.080 2.931 70.287
8 14.301 47.113 4.800 33.786 6.689 20.545 2.908 69.858
9 14.301 47.112 4.803 33.785 6.678 20.907 2.890 69.525
10 14.301 47.111 4.803 33.784 6.670 21.195 2.876 69.259
Note：1 Standard errors are not shown in the table.  2 The period for 1994-2016Q1
Sources: Author's calculation based on the data of International Financial Statistics(IMF), Bank Indonesia
 Table 5-2: Variance Decomposition of GDP growth (Indonesia) [BVAR]
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3. 6 Impulse Response Functions
 In order to confirm the above tentative results, impulse response functions 
through VAR (vector autoregressive) model will be used to identify the effects of 
increase in the capital inflows (Total, FDI, portfolio, Other investment) and that of 
the policy changes of capital controls on the real economy, as well as the financial/ 
monetary markets and in Indonesia during 1994-2011. The variables include: i) 
GDP growth rate; ii) Manufacturing production (the whole sector [Mfg] and nondu-
rable manufacturing [Nondurable Mfg]); iii) Real effective exchange rate (REER) ; 
iv) Money stock (M2) ; v) Interest rate (money market rate); VI) Share prices 
(Share). 
 The period is divided into two periods: the period 1994-2003, which covers the 
period of Asian Crisis under the IMF program, and the period of Post-IMF program 
during 2004-2016Q1, in order to study the difference between the two periods, in 
terms of independence of the policy on the real economy as well as financial/ mon-
etary sectors. To test the accumulated effects of the capital inflows, accumulated 
impulse response functions are presented in the VAR models.  
 Two models are examined as follows: 
 (i)  Capital inflow variables (Total/FDI/Portfolio/Other investment), manufac-
turing (total and nondurable, including oil/gas sector), and GDP growth;
 (ii)  Capital inflow variables, real effective exchange rate (REER); money 
stocks (M2); interest rate (money market rate [Intrate]), and share price 
(Share).
 In the first model, the effects of capital flows on the real economy, including 
GDP growth and manufacturing production are analysed. The manufacturing sec-
tors are divided into total (including durable manufacturing) and nondurable 
manufacturing sectors (incl. Petroleum and Coal Products, Crude Petroleum 
Products), which is classified by the International Financial Statistics (IFS) data-
base of IMF. It should be noted that the effects of capital inflows on the manufac-
turing industry are different between the sectors, especially durable and nondura-
ble manufacturing industries; the latter includes the energy sector, which is 
important for the Indonesian economy. 
 The second model includes foreign exchange rate (REER) and financial mar-
kets (M2; interest rate; share prices), to examine the effects of capital inflows on 
the markets.
 The two most common methods for estimating the optimal lag length for the 
VAR model are the Akaike and Schwarz information criterion (SBC, or the 
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Bayesian information criterion [BIC]). The analysis of VAR in this paper is based 
on the SBC, since the impulse response functions with SBC generally require 
shorter lags than that of AIC. 
 The other VAR model is Bayesian vector auto regression (BVAR) which uses 
Bayesian methods to estimate a vector auto regression (VAR) where parameters 
are treated as random variables, and prior probabilities are assigned to them. 
BVAR method could be used to estimate the response to some shock variables with 
not sufficient variables, which would be the case in point in the analysis is based on 
the  as quarterly data.
 In the following analysis, BVAR is also used together with VAR. In the impulse 
response functions are analysed by the VAR and BVAR in the following 
sub-sections.
 
3.6.1 Effects on the Real economy
 In the first model, including variables of GDP growth and manufacturing sec-
tor, the impulse response functions, are used to show clearly the magnitude of im-
pact upon the real sector, while the second model including variables of financial/
monetary markets utilizes ordinary impulse response functions, in order to indicate 
duration of the effects of external shocks.  
 The order of the variables in the second model is determined in accordance 
with the possible sequencing of results relating to capital inflows. The order of each 
variable in the model is based on the following sequences of capital inflows and the 
monetary authority’s operations:  
 The followings are the results of impulse response functions of each variable, 
which may or may not be realized in such a reasoning stated above.
 
(a) Response of Real GDP Growth 
 The impulse response function of GDP growth to net capital flows changed 
significantly from the period 1994-2003 to 2004-2016(Q1) in terms of the standard 
deviation of the response function, where the response is much smaller in the latter 
period, capital flows has successfully constrained by the capital controls and man-
agement (Table 6). This means that the impact of capital flows on the real GDP 
growth has become smaller since 2004, and this result is broadly in line with the 
results of the granger causality and variance composition of VAR presented in the 
former section. At the same time, the results generally indicate ‘pro-cyclical’ nature 
of capital flows on the real economy during 1994-2003 has become less significant 
since 2004.
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 While the response function of GDP growth had positively responded to the 
total capital inflows significantly during 1994-2003, it became insignificant during 
2008-2016Q1. This could show that several measures for capital management/ 
controls have been successful to avoid pro-cyclical nature of capital flows that are 
caused by short-term capital investment. The response to FDI and other invest-
ment became smaller and insignificant during the period 2004-2016(Q1) (Table 5, 
Fig.7-3). In the case of Indonesia, external borrowings (other capital inflows) have 
always been major resources for investment in the economy. However, the result 
indicates that the management of short term capital flows could be effective, since 
the response function during 2004-2016q1 is statistically insignificant.
 
(b) Response of Industrial (manufacturing) Production 
 The impulse response function of (total) manufacturing to total capital inflows 
over the period shows relatively limited effect on production activities, though the 
response functions are positive (Table 6, Fig.7-1).
 While the response function of the manufacturing to portfolio and other invest-
ment inflows and that of nondurable manufacturing (including oil and other energy 
sector) were positive during 1994-2003, the response of total manufacturing as well 
as nondurable manufacturing turned to insignificant during 2004-2016Q1. Also, 
the positive response of manufacturing to FDI inflows became insignificant, as 
shown in the response of BVAR.  This could be explained by the fact that the real 
economy has not been affected by the external capital flows in recent years14.
 Thus, both VAR and BVAR based impulse response functions show that the 
overall effects of capital flows on manufacturing production and GDP growth have 
become less significant during 2004-2016(Q1), as compared with the 
period1994-2003.
 The above results also suggest that the effect of capital inflows on the manu-
facturing (both total and nondurable, oil and other sectors) sector as well as GDP 
growth  has become much smaller, as shown in the standard deviation of the im-
pulse response function during the period 2004-2016Q1. This indicates that the 
real economy - domestic production and GDP growth- has become less dependent 
on the external capital resources recently.
 The overall results of impulse response functions of GDP growth and produc-
tion are in accordance with the results shown in the Granger causality tests, and it 
indicates that several measures on capital account and foreign exchange controls / 
management have certain effects on the economy to minimize the volatile effects 
from the capital flows since 2004 until today.
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VAR estimation
1994～ 40023002 ～2016 (Q1)
Total
Total MFG NDMFG GDP Total MFG NDMFG GDP
 0.551970  0.588833  0.024907 0.176321 0.182851 0.393434  3.130254  0.023339
(0.15747) (0.23883) (0.28831) (0.08311) (0.14576) (0.16300) (4.47721) (0.03294)
[ 3.50521] [ 2.46554] [ 0.08639] [ 2.12159] [ 1.25445] [ 2.41372] [ 0.69915] [ 0.70857]
FDI
FDI MFG NDMFG GDP FDI MFG NDMFG GDP
-0.41614  2.528130 -1.41666 0.904783 0.247171 -0.49108  5.816285 -0.07061
(0.16870) (1.20486) (1.40159) (0.40791) (0.14125) (0.47909) (12.5389) (0.09186)
[-2.46670] [ 2.09828] [-1.01075] [ 2.21808] [ 1.74992] [-1.02503] [ 0.46386] [-0.76862]
Portfolio
Portfolio MFG NDMFG GDP Portfolio MFG NDMFG GDP
 0.182633  0.927585  0.295472 0.232188 0.086849 0.151622  8.773932  0.020522
(0.17322) (0.40262) (0.47852) (0.14224) (0.14727) (0.26933) (6.87885) (0.05145)
[ 1.05437] [ 2.30388] [ 0.61747] [ 1.63232] [ 0.58973] [ 0.56296] [ 1.27549] [ 0.39891]
Other
Other MFG NDMFG GDP Other MFG NDMFG GDP
 0.380364  1.231048 -0.04762 0.499072 0.036381 0.617389 -1.93699  0.037497
(0.20557) (0.64575) (0.75481) (0.21505) (0.15047) (0.19579) (5.62410) (0.04104)
[ 1.85033] [ 1.90639] [-0.06309] [ 2.32075] [ 0.24179] [ 3.15329] [-0.34441] [ 0.91362]
Baysian VAR
Total
Total MFG NDMFG GDP Total MFG NDMFG GDP
 0.153251  0.120901  0.008963 0.045980 -0.02971 0.056495  0.536351  0.082151
(0.08252) (0.08055) (0.07074) (0.02148) (0.08123) (0.10386) (1.23584) (0.08958)
[ 1.85711] [ 1.50101] [ 0.12670] [ 2.14090] [-0.36578] [ 0.54395] [ 0.43400] [ 0.91705]
FDI
FDI MFG NDMFG GDP FDI MFG NDMFG GDP
 0.312330  0.292961  0.274802 0.124947 0.041073 0.024426  1.046116  0.148518
(0.07339) (0.38051) (0.28947) (0.10144) (0.08320) (0.26696) (3.16496) (0.23034)
[ 4.25601] [ 0.76992] [ 0.94934] [ 1.23171] [ 0.49369] [ 0.09150] [ 0.33053] [ 0.64477]
Portfolio
Portfolio MFG NDMFG GDP Portfolio MFG NDMFG GDP
 0.020185  0.174888  0.122146 0.067187 0.032782 0.051089  0.997582  0.095756
(0.08392) (0.13589) (0.11616) (0.03777) (0.08294) (0.13527) (1.59287) (0.11470)
[ 0.24053] [ 1.28701] [ 1.05156] [ 1.77867] [ 0.39526] [ 0.37768] [ 0.62628] [ 0.83487]
Other
Other MFG NDMFG GDP Other MFG NDMFG GDP
 0.118383  0.201796 -0.18179 0.053905 -0.0502 0.042392 -0.22256 -0.00871
(0.08380) (0.18041) (0.13080) (0.05054) (0.07918) (0.12369) (1.46641) (0.10451)
[ 1.41268] [ 1.11855] [-1.38984] [ 1.06662] [-0.63400] [ 0.34271] [-0.15177] [-0.08336]
Notes:  1. Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in  [ ]. 
            2. Shaded areas show that the response functions are statistically significant.
Sources: Author's calculation based on the IFS database (IMF), Bank Indonesia
Table 6: Impulse Response to Capital Flows (1) : VAR / Bayesian VAR
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Fig.7-1  Impulse Response (1) Capital Inflows; Mfg; Non-durable Mfg, GDP 
growth [1994-2003]
Fig.7-2  Impulse Response (1) Capital Inflows; Mfg; Non-durable Mfg, GDP 
growth [1994-2003] (BVAR)
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Fig.7-3  Impulse Response (1) Capital Inflows; Mfg; Non-durable Mfg, GDP 
growth [2004-2016Q1]
Fig.7-4  Impulse Response (1) Capital Inflows; Mfg; Non-durable Mfg, GDP 
growth [2004-2016Q1] (BVAR)
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3.6.2 Effects on the Exchange Rate and Monetary/Financial Sectors
In this model, the variables include: capital flows (Total; FDI; Portfolio; Other in-
vestment) variables, real effective exchange rate (REER); money stocks (M2); inter-
est rate (money market rate [Intrate]), and Share price (Share). Based on the VAR 
and BVAR models, analyses are made on the capital inflows on the market. To ex-
amine the effects of capital flows in different period, the periods are divided into 2 
periods: (a) 1994-2003; (b) 2008Q3-2016Q1 (post-IMF program period). The sum-
marized results of each impulse response function are shown in Table 6 (variables 
and Fig 8-1 ~ 8-4
 
(a) Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) 
The impulse response functions of real effective exchange rate (REER) to capital 
inflows, especially short-term capital flows (Portfolio/other investment) became 
much smaller and statistically insignificant in terms of standard deviation during 
the period 2004-2016Q1, compared with the period 1994-2003. This is common to 
both response functions of VAR and BVAR. 
 In the response functions of REER to portfolio and other capital inflows, the 
degree of standard deviation became insignificant and  smaller during 2004-
2016Q1 as compared with that during 1994-2003. This indicates that the manage-
ment of exchange rate of local currency has been successful in stabilizing the real 
exchange rate, avoiding significant appreciation and volatility of the real effective 
exchange rate, even under the increased pressure of short-term capital inflows 
with the expansion of the global capital flows since the mid-2000s. 
 
(b) Money Stock (M2) 
The impulse response functions of M2 to capital inflows also show similar trends as 
the case of REER: the degree of standard deviation of during 2004-2016Q1 is much 
smaller, as compared with the period 1994-2003 (Fig.8-1 ~ 8-4). Particularly, the 
impulse response functions of M2 to portfolio investment indicate very limited ef-
fect on M2 during 2004-2016Q1, if it is compared with the degree of deviation of the 
response functions with the previous period 1994-2003. This could be observed in 
both VAR and BVAR based analyses.  The smaller impact of the capital flows on 
the money stock (M2) during  2004-2016Q1 could be due to the central bank’s oper-
ation and several measures of prudential policies and foreign exchange manage-
ment/ controls introduced during the period15.
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Fig.8-1  Impulse Response (2) Capital Flows; REER; M2; Interest rate; 
Share [1994-2003]
Fig.8-2  Impulse Response (2) Capital Inflows; REER; M2; Interest rate; 
Share [1994-2003] (BVAR)
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Fig.8-3:  Impulse Response (2) Capital Inflows; REER; M2; Interest rate; 
Share [2004-2016]
Fig.8-4:   Impulse Response (2) Capital Inflows; REER; M2; Interest rate; 
Share [2004-2016] (BVAR)
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(c) Interest rate (money market rate) 
The impulse response functions of interest rate (money market rate) to all capital 
inflows were statistically significant during 1994-2003 (Fig.8-1 ~ 8-2). However, it 
became much smaller and insignificant and the magnitude of response itself was 
very limited in terms of standard deviation (see the scales of the axis in the figures) 
during 2004-2016Q1 in both VAR and BVAR. It indicates that the monetary policy 
was actually effective in stabilizing the money market interest rates in Indonesia 
even under the increase in the capital flows, including short-term capital since 
mid-2000s16.  
 
(d) Share prices (Share) 
The capital inflows generally had small impact upon the share prices, as we see the 
impulse response functions are statistically insignificant during the whole period 
2004-2016Q1.  This is generally accounted for by the fact that stability of the 
economy and the market has been realized during the period. Thus, the capital 
market has become more independent as compared with the period of 1994-2003, 
during which significant response to portfolio investment flows is observed.  
 
3.7 Overall evaluation
The overall results of impulse response functions of GDP growth, production, as 
well as foreign exchange and monetary/financial sectors are summarized as 
follows:
 First, the impact of capital inflows upon the real sector as well as monetary 
and financial markets has become limited and increasingly smaller since 2004. 
This is shown by the standard deviation of the impulse response functions based on 
VAR/BVAR models, and the results became insignificant over the period 2004-
2016Q1. This result is also in line with the results of Granger causality tests in the 
former section. It could be due to the fact that capital management and prudential 
controls in Indonesia have been strengthened since 2004 after the termination of 
the IMF program.
 Second, FDI inflows have put smaller impact upon the real sector, as well as 
the monetary and financial sector during 2004-2016Q1 as compared with that of 
1994-2003. This shows that FDI inflows are not always invested in productive 
sectors and the GDP growth and productive activities are not dependent on the 
external capital resources.
 Third, portfolio investment has significantly changed and put very limited 
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effect on the real economy and the capital market in recent years, as compared with 
the period of 1994-2003, when significantly negative effect on the GDP growth and 
manufacturing sectors observed. This implies that the domestic economy and the 
market have become independent and less affected by the capital flows since 2004. 
 Fourth, other investment inflows (mainly external borrowings) were the major 
source for investment and production in the manufacturing sectors during the 
whole period, but the impact of other (short-term) investment on GDP growth and 
production has become limited in Indonesia recently. 
 The above results suggest that the capital management / controls of short term 
capital flows could be effective, since the response function indicates significantly 
positive effects on the GDP growth and manufacturing industry during 2004-
2016Q1. On the other hand, there is no negative effects on the exchange and finan-
cial markets during the same period.
 Therefore, the results based on the VAR / BVAR models indicate that the 
overall effects of capital inflows on the real economy and the domestic market have 
significantly decreased recently.  This means that pro-cyclicality of capital flows 
has been mitigated by several capital management/controls since 2004. It could be 
concluded that economic and monetary policy have become more independent in 
Indonesia after the termination of the IMF program, which made the country to 
adopt foreign exchange and capital control measures.
 
4. Concluding Remarks
 This paper evaluates the overall effects of capital inflows (FDI, portfolio, other 
investment) on the real economy (GDP growth, production), as well as foreign ex-
change and monetary/ financial sectors in Indonesia during 1994-2016Q1, which 
covers the period of Asian crisis (1997/8) and the IMF program (1994-2003) regime, 
as well as the post-IMF program period since 2004. The study also examined the 
overall effects of capital management and controls introduced after the IMF pro-
gram period since 2004.
 The analysis is based on the VAR (Vector autoregressive) and Bayesian VAR 
(BVAR) models to examine the impact of capital inflows (net) on the GDP growth, 
manufacturing production (whole sector), nondurable manufacturing (incl. oil, coal 
and petroleum sector), real effective exchange rate (REER), money stocks (M2), 
interest rate (money market rate), and share prices. Analyses including Granger 
causality test and impulse response function, are undertaken to identify the effects 
of the changes in the capital inflows between the former (1997-2003) and later pe-
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riod (2004-2016Q1).
 The outcome of Granger causality test and impulse response functions of each 
capital inflow variable shows that the overall impact of capital inflows, especially 
short-term capital, on the real sector of the economy (GDP growth, manufacturing) 
as well as monetary and financial sectors have become smaller and insignificant 
since the termination of the IMF program in 2004. 
 The results of impulse response functions clearly show that standard deviation 
of response  functions of each variable (GDP growth, manufacturing production, 
REER, M2, Interest rate, share prices) became significantly smaller and  insignifi-
cant during the period of ‘post-IMF’ program, as compared with that of 1994-2003, 
especially during the period of post-Lehman shock (2008Q3-2016Q1), during which 
the effects of capital flows on the economy and market in Indonesia have become 
significantly smaller and minimized in the ‘post-IMF’ regime since 2004. 
 The above results indicate that the Indonesian economy is now less dependent 
on capital flows in the real economy as well as the monetary/ financial sector, which 
would reduce the risk of speculative short capital flows through mitigating pro-cy-
clical nature of capital flows. This outcome could be caused by independent econom-
ic/ monetary policy including several measures of capital account and foreign ex-
change management and controls by the Indonesian authority (Bank Indonesia), 
that have been undertaken with the termination of IMF program in 2003. The 
policy changes put positive effects on the real economy with less pro-cyclicality and 
volatility of the foreign exchange, monetary/ financial sectors, and contribute to 
stabilization of the real economy in Indonesia in the 2000s. As a result, the 
Indonesian economy has become more resilient to the significant changes in capital 
flows before and after the global financial crisis (2008). 
 It could be concluded that the experience of Indonesia gives us an important 
lesson of capital account management and controls, which enable developing and 
emerging countries to conduct independent monetary and foreign exchange 
policies. 
Notes:
1. Several scholars, including Krugman and Subramanian, consider that capital account liber-
alization policies are to be introduced from the viewpoint of stability of the capital and financial 
markets. See Subramanian (2009), Krugman (2009). The IMF finally admitted that capital control 
measures in capital inflows could be effective in case of emergency (Ostry et al. 2010, 2011). This 
was officially claimed by the statement by the IMF staff, “IMF was looking at range of measures 
to gauge what would be the appropriate response for countries, including capital controls, 
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currency appreciation, reserves accumulation and fiscal contraction.” in January 2011(IMF 2011). 
Although the IMF has made statement on the effectiveness of controls on capital inflows as 
short-term capital management, it has not admitted that capital account controls and manage-
ment should be introduced medium to long-term term for developing countries. 
2. In this regard, Stiglitz (2011) also claims the effectiveness of capital controls and regulations 
to ensure financial stability, not as temporary measures.
3. Yoshitomi (2003) introduced the background of external borrowing without hedging exchange 
rate among the Indonesian entities before the Asian Crisis
4. Stand-By arrangement (SBA) program of IMF was introduced in November 1997, which was 
extended to the Extended Facility until 2003. Foreign exchange controls were introduced in 
Indonesia in 2001.  
5. The KAOPEN index may not reflect several changes in capital and foreign exchange controls 
introduced in the 2000s.
6. The IMF’s stance towards capital account controls changed after the resignation of Stanley 
Fischer (the former First Deputy Managing Director) in the midst of the Argentine Crisis in 2001. 
Fischer was the key person of the IMF who promoted capital account liberalization and fixed 
foreign exchange regime during his period (1994-2001).
7. IBRAs’ objectives were to administer the government's blanket guarantee program, and to 
supervise, manage and restructure distress banks in line with the IMF program. The bad debt 
was separated from the major body of banks which need capital injection, but the debt has not 
decreased in the past years, so that the essentially restructuring the banking sector was the major 
role for IBRA. It dissolved in April 2004, after the termination of the IMF program. The activity 
of IBRA was not substantially effective until 2001, and the major role was to injection of the cap-
ital for the restructuring major banks (Takayasu, 2005 Ch.4). There is some question whether the 
IBRA was really effective in the reforming the whole banking sector. See Komatsu (2008). 
8. Azis (2001) suggests that debt resolution and keeping the interest rate from surging contin-
ually in the case of capital account crises.
9. Aramaki (2008) indicates the segregated account of local currency with dollars and other 
convertible currencies,) in comparison with Korea and Thailand.
10 . The amount of current account is based on the goods and services. The IFS database pro-
vides a separate dataset, which indicates current account (net) ‘Excludes Exceptional Financing’. 
The current account deficit based on the latter indicates 4.7% of GDP in the 2nd quarter of 1996. 
11. It is important to examine the effect of capital inflows on the real sector, so that the VAR 
models of (1) and (2) include two variables, GDP growth and industrial production (manufactur-
ing), respectively.
12 . The logarithm of real effective exchange rate (REER) also could be rejected on the unit root 
test, without first lag. Armad & Masood (2009) suggested that the effects of capital inflows on 
long-term relations of real effective exchange rates (REER) based both on the export and trade 
based prices. They indicated that the REER has bi-directional causality and cointegration rela-
tionship between total capital inflows, as well as the total foreign reserves, using unit root tests 
(ADF and Schmidt & Phillips) and cointegration test. 
13. The Granger Causality test usually involved p-value of each variable, together with F-test 
based value. However, the analysis in this paper only shows the results of F-test.
14. This could be partly due to the fact that FDI inflows facilitate imports of capital goods and 
other materials, which result in deterioration of the current account. Supporting industries in 
Indonesia are still small in several manufacturing sectors, so that increase in imports would 
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deteriorate the trade and current account balance with the surge of FDI recently. In this respect, 
there is some possibility that increasing imported intermediate inputs would hinder the develop-
ment of backward linkages, which could be one of the major forces for manufacturing and economic 
growth. Alfaro et al. (2010) suggests such a lack of backward linkages may hinder the growth.
15. The costs of ‘sterilization’ borne by the central bank went up for the issuance of SBI in 
Indonesia in 2010. The costs of ‘sterilization’ in Indonesia is relatively high, due to the interest 
payment and other cost of issuance of SBI (see US City Investment Research). 
16. The interbank money market rates are influenced by the changes in minimum requirement 
of the reserves at the Central Bank, which are used to control the market rates.
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